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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Marmon Coal Company and its carrier (collectively, 
“Marmon”) petition for review of a decision by the Benefits 
Review Board (the “Board”) of the U.S. Department of Labor 
(the “DOL”), which confirmed an award of survivors’ 
benefits to Ethel Eckman under the Black Lung Benefits Act 
(the “BLBA”), 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., as amended by the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”), 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556, 124 Stat. 119, 260 (2010).  For 
the reasons stated below, we will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
A.  Statutory Background 
The BLBA provides coal miners and their surviving 
dependents with a means to obtain benefits in compensation 
for the disabling effects of pneumoconiosis (i.e., black lung 
disease).  There have been several changes in the law with 
respect to survivors’ benefits over the past forty-four years.  
Congress first provided benefits to surviving dependents of 
coal miners afflicted with pneumoconiosis through the 
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (the 
“FCMHSA”), 30 U.S.C. § 841 et seq.  In 1972, Congress 
amended the FCMHSA and re-designated Title IV of the Act 
as the BLBA.  The BLBA has been amended numerous times 
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since its original enactment.1  Until 1982, a deceased miner’s 
dependents could obtain survivors’ benefits under the BLBA 
by showing that the miner’s death was substantially caused by 
pneumoconiosis or by merely showing that the miner had 
been awarded benefits during his lifetime.  Thus, surviving 
dependents were entitled to benefits automatically if the 
miner had been awarded benefits during his lifetime, even if 
pneumoconiosis played no role in the miner’s death.2
In 1981, due to a soaring increase in the number of 
claims for benefits under the BLBA, Congress prospectively 
eliminated the automatic entitlement to benefits for surviving 
dependents.  See Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, 
Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635 (1981).  Instead, after 
January 1, 1982, surviving dependents could receive benefits 
  See 30 
U.S.C. § 922(a)(2) (1970). 
                                              
1 The Black Lung Benefits Act was significantly 
amended in 1977, 1981, and 2010.  See Black Lung Benefits 
Revenue Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (1978); 
Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978); Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 
1981 and Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. 
No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635 (1981); Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
2 This design for awarding benefits has been referred 
to as an automatic “derivative benefits” system.  See Union 
Carbide Corp. v. Richards, --- F.3d ---, Nos. 12-1978, 12-
1294, 2013 WL 3358994, at *1 (4th Cir. July 5, 2013). 
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only after proving that pneumoconiosis substantially 
contributed to the miner’s death. 
The DOL regulations pertaining to the BLBA, as 
amended in 1981, distinguish between survivors’ “previously 
filed” claims and survivors’ “subsequent” claims.  20 C.F.R. 
§ 725.309(d).  A “subsequent” claim is a claim filed “more 
than one year after the effective date of a final order denying 
a claim previously filed by the claimant.”  Id.  The DOL 
comments to this regulation include the following statement: 
“Where a previous survivor’s claim was denied 
solely on the basis that the survivor did not 
prove that the miner died due to 
pneumoconiosis, an element not subject to 
change, the survivor may be barred from 
litigating another claim filed more than one year 
after the denial of the first one.” 
65 Fed. Reg. 79973. 
In 2010, Congress enacted the ACA, the much 
publicized and debated healthcare law.  Lost in the larger 
debate over the proper role of the federal government in the 
health insurance market was a little known provision of the 
ACA that amended the BLBA and reinstated automatic 
entitlement to benefits for surviving dependents.  See ACA 
§ 1556; B&G Constr. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 662 F.3d 233, 247-
53 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the ACA reinstated automatic 
entitlement to benefits for surviving dependents).  The BLBA 
provision titled “Filing of new claims or refiling or 
revalidation of claims of miners already determined eligible 
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at time of death,” which is codified at 30 U.S.C. § 932(l), now 
reads as follows: 
“In no case shall the eligible survivors of a 
miner who was determined to be eligible to 
receive benefits under this subchapter at the 
time of his or her death be required to file a new 
claim for benefits, or refile or otherwise 
revalidate the claim of such miner.” 
Section 1556(b) of the ACA simply eliminated from the end 
of § 932(l) the following language:  “except with respect to a 
claim filed under this part on or after the effective date of the 
Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981.”  Critically, for 
purposes of this case, § 1556(c) of the ACA specifies the 
applicability and scope of the amendment to § 932(l): 
“The amendments made by this Section shall 
apply with respect to claims filed under part B 
or part C of the Black Lung Benefits Act (30 
U.S.C. 921 et seq., 931 et seq.) after January 1, 
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2005, that are pending on or after the date of 
enactment of this Act.”3
 The DOL, on March 30, 2012, proposed new 
regulations to implement the ACA’s amendments to § 932(l).  
See 77 Fed. Reg. 19456-78.  The proposed regulations take 
the position that “the ACA created, for certain survivors, a 
new cause of action by establishing a new method of 
demonstrating entitlements to benefits.”  Id. at 19468.  The 
proposed regulations further provide that § 932(l), as 
amended, “applies to all survivors’ claims meeting the 
effective-date requirements” and that the amendment 
“fundamentally altered the legal landscape for subsequent 
survivors’ claims and requires a revision to current 
§ 725.309(d).”  Id. 
 
                                              
3 In B&G Construction Co. v. Director, OWCP, we 
noted that the ACA “relieves a survivor from filing a new 
claim for benefits provided the survivor files a claim for 
benefits after January 1, 2005, a seeming inconsistency,” but 
that “surely a widow seeking benefits must file something in 
order to receive them.”  662 F.3d 233, 244 n.12 (3d Cir. 
2011).  We now confirm that indeed a widow must file 
something in order to receive benefits, and we clarify that 
there is no inconsistency with respect to the ACA’s effect on 
the BLBA:  the ACA revives § 932(l)’s automatic benefits to 
the extent that a survivor files a claim for benefits after 
January 1, 2005, that is pending on or after the ACA’s 
effective date, March 23, 2010. 
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B.  Factual and Procedural History 
After leaving coal mining, John Eckman filed a claim 
for benefits under the BLBA in 1985.  An Administrative 
Law Judge (“ALJ”) awarded benefits in 1993, and the Board 
affirmed the decision on appeal.  Marmon then paid benefits 
to John Eckman until his death on May 2, 2002.  John 
Eckman’s widow, Ethel Eckman, filed a claim for benefits as 
a dependent survivor on May 7, 2002, five days after her 
husband’s death.  An ALJ denied her claim in 2005, finding 
that although John Eckman had pneumoconiosis, Ethel 
Eckman failed to prove that his death was due to the disease.  
Ethel Eckman appealed to the Board, which affirmed the 
ALJ’s decision on March 28, 2006.  The Board’s decision 
became final on May 27, 2006. 
 After Congress enacted the ACA and amended the 
BLBA on March 23, 2010, Ethel Eckman filed a new claim 
on September 10, 2010.  A DOL district director awarded 
benefits based on her new claim.  Marmon then asked for an 
ALJ hearing.  The ALJ agreed with the district director and 
awarded benefits.  The ALJ specifically found that Ethel 
Eckman satisfied the familial relationship and dependency 
criteria for survivors under the BLBA.  The ALJ also found 
that, based on John Eckman’s lifetime disability award and 
the filing date of Ethel Eckman’s subsequent claim, Ethel 
Eckman was entitled to benefits under § 932(l), as amended 
by the ACA.  The ALJ awarded benefits as of April 2006, the 




 Marmon appealed to the Board, arguing that Ethel 
Eckman’s subsequent claim was barred by the DOL’s pre-
ACA regulations and principles of res judicata.  The Board 
rejected these arguments.  After affirming the award, the 
Board modified the entitlement date on the claim to June 
2006, the month after the Board’s decision on the original 
claim became final.  Marmon then petitioned this Court for 
review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over a petition for review of a 
final order from the Board under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c).  The 
Board’s decisions on matters of law are subject to plenary 
review.  Lombardy v. Dir., OWCP, 355 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
III. 
 This case concerns a “subsequent” claim for benefits 
by a surviving dependent under the recently amended BLBA.  
With respect to original or first-time claims, we have already 
determined that § 932(l), as amended, automatically entitles 
surviving dependents to benefits if the miners were eligible to 
receive benefits at the time of their deaths.  See B&G Constr., 
662 F.3d at 247-53.  Now, we must determine (1) whether 
§ 932(l), as amended, applies to a subsequent claim for 
benefits where the original claim was denied due to the 
claimant’s failure to show that pneumoconiosis substantially 
contributed to the miner’s death, and (2) whether res judicata 
precludes a post-amendment award of survivors’ benefits on a 
subsequent claim where the original claim was denied due to 
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the claimant’s failure to show that pneumoconiosis 
substantially contributed to the miner’s death. 
The only Court of Appeals to have addressed these 
issues has held that § 932(l), as amended, applies to 
subsequent claims that are filed and pending within the proper 
temporal thresholds, and that res judicata does not preclude a 
post-amendment award of survivors’ benefits on a subsequent 
claim where the original claim was denied due to the 
claimant’s failure to show that pneumoconiosis substantially 
contributed to the miner’s death.  See Union Carbide Corp. v. 
Richards, --- F.3d ---, Nos. 12-1978, 12-1294, 2013 WL 
3358994 (4th Cir. July 5, 2013). 
A.  The Scope of ACA § 1556 
 Marmon’s first argument is that Eckman’s subsequent 
claim is foreclosed by the lack of a specific reference to 
subsequent claims in the language of ACA § 1556(c), which 
outlines the applicability and scope of the ACA’s 
amendments to the BLBA.  Thus, our first task is to 
determine whether the success of a subsequent claim is 
foreclosed by the following statutory language:  “The 
amendments made by this Section shall apply with respect to 
claims filed . . . after January 1, 2005, that are pending on or 
after the date of enactment of this Act.”  ACA § 1556(c) 
(emphasis added). 
The goal of statutory interpretation is to “give effect to 
Congress’s intent.”  B&G Constr., 662 F.3d at 248.  The most 
reliable indication of Congress’s intent is found in the plain 
language of the statute.  Id.  Where the statutory language is 
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plain and unambiguous, it is rarely necessary to inquire 
further into the statute’s meaning.  Id.  Further inquiry should 
be made only “where the literal application of the statute will 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of 
its drafters, or where the result would be so bizarre that 
Congress could not have intended it.”  Id. 
Section 1556(c) of the ACA refers to “claims” without 
any qualifying language.  The reference to claims is not 
explicitly limited to “first time” or “original” claims and it 
does not explicitly exclude “subsequent” claims.  Presumably, 
Congress could have explicitly indicated that the amendment 
excludes subsequent claims, but Congress made no such 
indication.  Thus, the plain language of ACA § 1556(c) 
encompasses Eckman’s subsequent claim, which was filed 
after January 1, 2005, and was pending after March 23, 2010, 
the date of the ACA’s enactment. 
 There is no evidence of congressional intent that 
would contradict this plain language reading of the statute.  
The legislative history associated with ACA § 1556 is rather 
sparse.  In fact, the only legislative history of record 
pertaining to this particular section is a post-enactment 
statement by Senator Robert Byrd, which states as follows: 
“It is clear that the section will apply to all 
claims that will be filed henceforth, including 
many claims filed by miners whose prior claims 
were denied, or by widows who never filed for 
benefits following the death of a husband.  But 
section 1556 will also benefit all of the 
claimants who have recently filed a claim, and 
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are awaiting or appealing a decision or order, or 
who are in the midst of trying to determine 
whether to seek a modification of a recent 
order. 
Section 1556 applies immediately to all pending 
claims, including claims that were finally 
awarded or denied prior to the date of 
enactment of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, for which the claimant 
seeks to modify a denial, or for which other 
actions are taken in order to modify an award or 
denial, in accordance with 20 CFR 725.309(c) 
or 725.310.  Section 1556 applies even if a final 
order is modified, or actions are taken to bring 
about the modification of an order, subsequent 
to the date of enactment of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, in 
accordance with the sections of Part 725 that I 
mentioned.” 
156 Cong. Rec. S2083-84 (Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Byrd). 
We have not lost sight of the Supreme Court’s 
statement that “[p]ost-enactment legislative history is not only 
oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight.”  
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 530 n.27 (2007).  
However, because we have previously stated that this 
particular piece of legislative history is “nevertheless 
significant inasmuch as [Senator Byrd] was the sponsor of 
section 1556, a single amendment in a complex bill of great 
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length,” B&G Constr., 662 F.3d at 251, we will address the 
substance of Senator Byrd’s statement as it applies to the 
issue at hand. 
 Marmon asserts that the first sentence of Senator 
Byrd’s statement includes an exhaustive list of claims 
affected by ACA § 1556, and because the list does not 
include subsequent claims by survivors, his statement must be 
interpreted to support the position that ACA § 1556 does not 
cover such claims.  However, Senator Byrd’s reference to the 
section as “including” certain claims does not necessarily 
indicate that his list is exhaustive.  See Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2170 (2012) 
(addressing a statutory definition introduced with the verb 
“includes,” and stating that “[t]his word choice is significant 
because it makes clear that the examples enumerated in the 
text are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive”); see also 
Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 
95, 100 (1941) (“the term ‘including’ is not one of all-
embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative 
application of the general principle”).  Indeed, Senator Byrd’s 
list does not include the largest class of potential claims:  
original claims filed by miners, either pending or filed 
henceforth.  Furthermore, Senator Byrd’s first sentence 
reference to “all claims” supports an interpretation of ACA 
§ 1556 that does not exclude subsequent claims.  Thus, this 
post-enactment statement does not support a reading of ACA 
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§ 1556(c) that is contrary to a literal interpretation of the 
section’s plain language.4
 Marmon’s argument with respect to the applicability 
and scope of ACA § 1556(c), however, does not end with the 
section’s plain language and legislative history.  Rather, 
Marmon asserts that we cannot interpret ACA § 1556(c) to 
encompass subsequent claims because to do so would 
contradict principles of finality and res judicata.  On this 
point, Marmon relies heavily on Pittston Coal Group v. 
Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 122-23 (1988), where a class of 
claimants failed to appeal the DOL’s denial of their claims 
under the BLBA, but asked for their claims to be re-opened 
and re-adjudicated because the DOL had applied the wrong 
entitlement criteria.  The Supreme Court agreed that the DOL 
failed to apply the proper entitlement criteria, but declined to 
re-open and re-adjudicate the finally determined claims 
 
                                              
4 Senator Byrd also stated that ACA § 1556 applies to 
“all pending claims, including claims that were finally 
awarded or denied . . . for which the claimant seeks to modify 
a denial . . . in accordance with 20 CFR 725.309(c).”  
Marmon asserts that Senator Byrd’s reference to 
§ 725.309(c), which pertains to modification of claims, 
instead of § 725.309(d), which pertains to subsequent claims, 
indicates a desire to exclude subsequent claims.  However, 
this assertion is contradicted by the same reasoning that belies 
Marmon’s other legislative history arguments:  a reference to 
the section as “including” certain claims does not indicate 
exclusivity.  See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
132 S. Ct. 2156, 2170 (2012). 
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absent specific congressional authorization.  Id. at 121-23.  
The Court re-emphasized the principle that a claimant cannot 
“avoid the bar of res judicata on the ground that the decision 
was wrong.”  Id. at 123. 
 Pittston Coal Group, however, is not sufficiently on 
point to control the issue at hand.  In contrast to the claimants 
in Pittston Coal Group, Eckman is not seeking to “re-open” a 
previously denied claim or to “avoid the bar of res judicata” 
on the ground that her original claim was wrongly decided.  
Instead, Eckman brings a “subsequent” claim based on new 
assertions of entitlement.  Thus, contrary to Marmon’s 
argument, our conclusion that ACA § 1556(c) encompasses 
subsequent claims does not disregard principles of finality 
and res judicata, and because we have no intention of 
disregarding such principles, we will address in the following 
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subsection the question of whether Eckman’s subsequent 
claim for survivors’ benefits is barred by res judicata.5
B.  Res Judicata 
 
 Res judicata bars a party from initiating a subsequent 
suit against the same adversary based on the same cause of 
action as a prior suit.  Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 
347 (3d Cir. 2010).  The purpose of res judicata is to “relieve 
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve 
judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, 
encourage reliance on adjudication.”  Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 
 Federal common law governs our determination as to 
whether a prior adjudication should be given preclusive 
effect.  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008).  A party 
                                              
5 The parties debate whether the interpretation of the 
BLBA by the Director of the Office of Workers’ 
Compensation Programs, expressed in lieu of a final rule, is 
deserving of Skidmore deference, and if so, to what extent 
deference should be afforded.  See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that the opinions of a 
responsible administrative agency “constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and 
litigants may properly resort for guidance”).  Because we 
conclude (without regard for deference) that the amended 
BLBA does not exclude subsequent claims, it is unnecessary 
to address whether, and to what extent, the Director’s 
interpretation should be afforded Skidmore deference. 
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seeking to invoke res judicata must establish three elements:  
“(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving 
(2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit 
based on the same cause of action.”  Duhaney, 621 F.3d at 
347 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “The 
doctrine of res judicata bars not only claims that were brought 
in a previous action, but also claims that could have been 
brought.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
The Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation 
Programs (the “Director”), the Federal Respondent in this 
case, does not dispute that Eckman’s prior suit resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits involving the same parties.  
Instead, the Director asserts that Eckman’s subsequent claim 
involves a different cause of action. 
 “We have disavowed attempts to create a simple test 
for determining what constitutes a cause of action for res 
judicata purposes.”  Id. at 348 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The focus of the inquiry is the “essential 
similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various 
legal claims.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Factors relevant to this determination include 
(1) whether the acts complained of were the same; 
(2) whether the material facts alleged in each suit were the 
same; and (3) whether the witnesses and documentation 
required to prove such allegations were the same.  Id.  The 
mere existence of common elements of fact between two 
claims does not establish the same cause of action if the 
critical acts and the necessary documentation were different 
for the two claims.  See id. at 349.  In addition, an identical 
sought-after remedy for each of the claims is not dispositive 
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for purposes of determining whether the second claim 
involves a new cause of action.  See id. 
 Here, although there were common elements of fact 
alleged in each suit, the material facts alleged in each suit 
were different, and the witnesses and documentation required 
to prove the material facts were also different.  In her first 
claim, Eckman could recover only by proving that her 
husband’s death was due to pneumoconiosis.  The resolution 
of that issue centered on the fact-finder’s review of medical 
evidence.  In contrast, in her subsequent claim, Eckman can 
recover without proving that her husband’s death was due to 
pneumoconiosis.  The cause of death is not at issue, and the 
medical evidence presented during the first claim is no longer 
relevant.  Rather, Eckman’s entitlement to benefits turns 
primarily on an administrative fact – whether her husband had 
been awarded benefits.  This administrative fact was not 
relevant to her first claim.  The subsequent claim thus 
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involves a different cause of action,6 and res judicata does not 
prevent Eckman from receiving survivors’ benefits under the 
BLBA.7
                                              
6 We have previously described res judicata in 
administrative adjudications as “not encrusted with the rigid 
finality that characterizes its application in purely judicial 
proceedings,” Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 691 (3d Cir. 
1985), and we have further held that “refusal to apply 
‘administrative’ res judicata in a strictly technical fashion is 
consistent with this circuit’s view that more significance 
should be placed on fairness in the administrative process 
than on the finality of administrative judgments.”  Id. at 693.  
However, in this case, we do not rely on any relaxed 
administrative standard to hold that Eckman’s subsequent 
claim involves a different cause of action than her original 
claim. 
 
7 Marmon’s due process argument is a variant of its res 
judicata argument in that Marmon contends that a claimant’s 
entitlement to benefits on a subsequent claim violates due 
process because it deprives coal mine operators of the benefit 
of finality.  See RAG Am. Coal Co. v. OWCP, 576 F.3d 418, 
428 n.6 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating in a footnote that a party’s 
“claim that the refusal to apply ordinary principles of finality 
denies it due process of law is nothing more than a variation 
of its res judicata argument”).  The finality of Eckman’s 
original claim is relevant to whether res judicata bars her 
subsequent claim.  However, because the subsequent claim 
was brought under a new cause action, res judicata does not 




 The Board did not err in confirming an award of 
survivors’ benefits to Eckman under the BLBA, as amended 
by the ACA.  Thus, we will deny Marmon’s petition for 
review. 
